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Abstract 
The rise of China raises fundamental questions about the future of the liberal international order 
(LIO) at a time when it is under ever more strain. Although China’s focus for some years was on 
joining and participating in existing multilateral institutions, today China is increasingly building 
its own. Prominent among them is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), launched in 
late 2014. Against the background of contending theoretical expectations, this article examines 
the extent to which the AIIB either reinforces or challenges the LIO and highlights what this tells 
us about China’s broader relationship with the LIO. We provide a definition of the LIO that is 
based on its social purpose rather than on its formal characteristics. State-centric approaches 
offer insights into China’s decision to engage in new institution building via the AIIB, but we 
argue that a focus on social purpose is necessary to assess the AIIB’s broader implications for the 
LIO. We find that, while conforming in large measure to existing institutional models, the AIIB 
promotes China’s integration into global social networks, strengthens state-led development 
pathways, and is associated with the Chinese norm of non-interference. The AIIB, thus, 
foreshadows the possibility of an institutionalised international order indifferent to liberalism. In 
sum, the AIIB reflects the tensions between the socialising effects of the LIO and China’s growing 
externalisation of its own non-liberal, state-led model of political economy. 
 
Introduction 
The liberal international order (LIO)—traditionally associated with rules-based multilateralism, 
economic openness, and the spread of liberal values and institutions, including representative 
democracy and human rights—has lately been buffeted from two directions.1 First, both the 
capacity and willingness of the United
                                                          
1 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order’, 
Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2009), pp. 71–87; G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of Liberal International 
Order?’, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2018), pp.7–23. 
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States to support liberal values and institutions at the global level have diminished. 
Secondly, China appears increasingly willing to assert a vision of international order that 
departs significantly from certain of the LIO’s key features, albeit while embracing other 
aspects of the current order. 
The United States has recently withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
unilaterally imposed import tariffs,2 repudiated the Paris climate accord,3 exited the United 
Nations Human Rights Council,4 and reduced financial support for the United Nations.5 The 
Chinese government, meanwhile, has been forthright in its defence of economic 
globalisation,6 increased its foreign aid,7 and pledged to ‘uphold the authority and status of 
the United Nations, actively fulfil China’s international obligations and duties, remain firmly 
committed to China’s pledges to tackle climate change, actively push for the Belt and Road 
Initiative, and always be a builder of world peace, contributor of global development and 
keeper of international order’.8 
A key part of China's new-found commitment to be a ‘keeper of international order’ has 
been the construction of new multilateral institutions, including the BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB, created in 2014), the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation 
Agreement (CMIM, signed in 2014), the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO, founded 2001), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP, under negotiation).9 
                                                          
2 ‘Trump Trade Tsar Wields Power over WTO Destiny’, Financial Times, 11 December, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/b59b4412-dc6f-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482. 
3 Valerie Volcovici, ‘U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact’, 4 August, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-
paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM. 
4 Gardiner Harris, ‘Trump Administration Withdraws U.S. from U.N. Human Rights Council’, The New York 
Times, 19 June, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-
human-rights.html. 
5 Rick Gladstone, ‘Taking Credit for U.N. Budget Cut, Trump’s Envoy Hints at More to Come’, The New York 
Times, 25 December, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/25/world/americas/trump-united-
nations-budget.html. 
6 ‘Keynote Speech by H. E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China’, at the Opening Session 
of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017, 17 January, 2017, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-
forum. 
7 James Griffiths, ‘Report Exposes Size of China’s Secretive Aid Budget’, 11 October, 2017, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/11/asia/china-overseas-aid/index.html. 
8 ‘Xi Demonstrates China’s Role as Responsible Country in New Year Address’, 1 January, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/01/c_136865307.htm. 
9 See, He Kai, ‘Contested Multilateralism 2.0 and Regional Order Transition: Causes and Implications’, 
Pacific Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (2018), pp. 1–11; Sebastian Heilmann, Moritz Rudolf, Mikko Huotari, and 
Johannes Buckow, ‘China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established 
International Order’, Chinamonitor, No. 18 (2018), https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-
01/China_Monitor_18_Shadow_Foreign_Policy_EN.pdf; Matthew D. Stephen, ‘Emerging Powers and 
Emerging Trends in Global 
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To date, one of the most prominent China-sponsored multilateral initiatives has been the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Several authors have examined the motivations 
prompting China’s decision to sponsor the AIIB.10 Some see it as part of a greater endeavour 
to ‘balance’ the United States;11 others have investigated the decisions of other countries to 
join the bank.12 There has also been debate over whether the AIIB represents a challenge to 
US hegemony or to the existing norms of multilateral development banks (MDBs). Earlier 
commentaries anticipated that the AIIB might pose a revisionist challenge to the existing 
institutional order,13 but more recent analyses have depicted the AIIB as largely conforming to
                                                          
Governance’, Global Governance, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2017), pp. 483–502; Ye Min, ‘China and Competing 
Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road’, Asian Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2015), pp. 206–
24; Yan Xuetong, ‘Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International Normative 
Order?’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2018), pp. 1–22. 
10 See, for example: Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, ‘The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: 
Multilateralism on the Silk Road’, China Economic Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2016), pp. 116–39; Chen Zheng and 
Liu Yanchuan, ‘Granting Reassurance While Posing Challenge: Explaining China’s Creation of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank’, GEG Working Paper, No. 130 (2017), http://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/granting-
reassurance-while-posing-challenge; Daniel C. K. Chow, ‘Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 49, No. 5 (2016), pp. 1255–98; Jonathan R. 
Strand, Eduardo M. Flores, and Michael W. Trevathan, ‘China’s Leadership in Global Economic Governance 
and the Creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Rising Powers Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016), 
pp. 55–69.; Ren Xiao, ‘China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB’, Pacific Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 
(2015), pp. 435–42; Yu Hong, ‘Motivation behind China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiatives and Establishment 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 26, No. 105 (2017), 
pp.353–68.  
11 He Kai, ‘Role Conceptions, Order Transition and Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific: A New 
Theoretical Framework’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (2018), pp. 92–109; Yuan 
Jing Dong, ‘Beijing’s Institutional-Balancing Strategies: Rationales, Implementation and Efficacy’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (2018), pp. 110–28. 
12 Tyler Pratt, ‘Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking’, paper delivered to 
the 10th Annual Conference of the Political Economy of International Organizations, Bern, 12–14 January, 
2017, http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Program%20PEIO10.pdf; Wang Yu, ‘The Political 
Economy of Joining the AIIB’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2018), pp. 105–30. 
13 Chow, ‘Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank’; Heilmann, ‘China’s Shadow 
Foreign Policy’; Shintaro Hamanaka, ‘Insights to Great Powers’ Desire to Establish Institutions: Comparison 
of ADB, AMF, AMRO and AIIB’, Global Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2016), pp.288–92; Rebecca Liao, ‘Out of the 
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standard institutional practices.14 Certain scholars, however, have situated the AIIB within a 
broader inter-institutional context, characterised by institutional proliferation and potential 
inter-institutional competition.15 De Jonge, meanwhile, emphasises that the AIIB represents 
the outcome of a recursive interaction between China’s domestic order and global norms.16 
This article goes beyond existing accounts of the AIIB in two ways. First, we argue that in order 
to understand the implications of the AIIB for the LIO and how China will relate to the liberal 
order in the coming decades, it is essential first to clarify the LIO and what it does. Therefore, 
we provide a clear and more targeted definition of the liberal international order as 
international institutions that wed the exercise of international power to liberal social purpose 
and use this benchmark to guide our empirical study.17 
Secondly, a satisfactory assessment of what the AIIB and other new institutions mean for the 
LIO requires us to move beyond traditional state-centric theories of international politics to 
engage with the societal sources of international behaviour. State-centric approaches to 
‘contested multilateralism’,18 rooted in functional and power-oriented types of 
institutionalism, offer formal accounts of institutional proliferation and provide useful insights 
into China’s decision to sponsor the AIIB.19 From a functionalist perspective, the AIIB arose 
partly as a response to the inefficiencies and institutional rigidities of existing multilateral 
                                                          
14 Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, ‘China Challenges Global Governance? Chinese International Development 
Finance and the AIIB’, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3 (2018), pp. 573–93; Robert J. Hanlon, ‘Thinking 
about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Can a China-Led Development Bank Improve Sustainability 
in Asia?’, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2017), pp. 541–54. Gregory Chin came to an 
intermediate conclusion, stressing both innovation and continuity. See Gregory T. Chin, ‘Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank: Governance Innovation and Prospects’, Global Governance, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2016), pp. 11–
26. 
15 Nick Bisley, ‘Contested Asia’s “New” Multilateralism and Regional Order’, Pacific Review, 
Vol. 78, No. 3 (2018), pp. 1–11; Miles Kellerman, ‘The Proliferation of Multilateral Development Banks’, 
Review of International Organizations, 28 February, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9302-y; 
Annalisa Prizzon, Romilly Greenhill, and Shakira Mustapha, ‘An “Age of Choice” for External Development 
Finance? Evidence from Country Case Studies’, Development Policy Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2018), pp. 29–45. 
16 Alice de Jonge, ‘Perspectives on the Emerging Role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (2017), pp. 1061–84. 
17 See also G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, ‘China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft’, Brookings 
Institution, April 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-
institutional-statecraft.pdf; Yan Xuetong, ‘Chinese Values vs. Liberalism’. 
18 Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’, Review of International Organizations, 
Vol. 9, No. 4 (2014), pp. 385–412. 
19 See, for example: Chen and Liu, ‘Granting Reassurance’; Morse and Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’; 
Pratt, ‘Angling for Influence’; Johannes Urpelainen and Thijs van de Graaf, ‘Your Place or Mine? Institutional 
Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
45, No. 4 (2015), pp. 799–827. 
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development banks. But as power-oriented theories would suggest, the AIIB also serves 
China’s desire to gain clout and status within international development institutions 
commensurate with its growing capabilities. 
Yet the LIO consists not only of formal institutions such as states and international 
organisations but also of an underlying social and normative order that embraces liberal social 
purposes.20 Whereas state-centric approaches emphasise the reasons why dissatisfied states 
build new institutions, the emphasis of societal approaches is on the substantive reasons for 
such state dissatisfaction and its substantive implications for international order and its social 
purpose. Seen in this light, we find that, much like China itself, the AIIB stands in a relationship 
of partial accommodation and partial challenge to the LIO: On the one hand, the AIIB builds 
upon the established structures and practices of existing MDBs and has actively collaborated 
with older development banks. The AIIB, thus, reflects China’s partial socialisation to the 
norms of the LIO, brought about by ever-deepening integration within a Western-designed 
system. On the other hand, the AIIB departs from established norms and objectives in 
significant ways, notably by rejecting liberal universalism and creating space for an emergent 
‘China model’ of development. In short, the AIIB may presage a potential ‘international order 
with Chinese characteristics’ that entwines both liberal and non-liberal features. 
We first define the LIO and unpack its component parts to provide a benchmark against which 
to assess the AIIB. Secondly, we compare the insights of two sets of theories—state-centric 
and societal—on the creation of the AIIB and its likely implications for international order. 
Thirdly, we evaluate the explanatory power of each theory, as regards understanding China’s 
relationship to the LIO, based on a qualitative analysis of the AIIB’s characteristics, such as its 
institutional design, staff composition formal policies, and early operations. 
 
Liberal International Order: Definition and Components 
Debates about China’s relationship to the LIO have suffered from a lack of clarity as to exactly 
what is meant by LIO. In particular, the LIO must be distinguished from international order per 
se. We define the contemporary LIO as constituted by an array of international institutions 
that wed the exercise of international power to liberal social purpose. Not all features of the 
current international order are liberal in character. Certain elements often associated with the 
LIO, such as sovereignty, international trade, and rules-based cooperation, have been present
 
                                                          
20 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); John W. 
Meyer, ‘World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 1 
(2010), pp. 1–20; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), pp. 561–98; David Skidmore, Contested Social Orders and International 
Politics (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997); Matthew D. Stephen, ‘Rising Powers, Global Capitalism 
and Liberal Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge’, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2014), pp. 912–38. 
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in non-liberal international orders.21 It is the particular way in which the LIO combines power 
and purpose that defines its liberal character. 
First, the LIO allocates and exercises forms of power. International organisations can exercise 
power directly—by allocating or withholding resources, imposing sovereignty costs, or 
authoritatively interpreting international norms,22 and indirectly—by reflecting the agendas of 
powerful states23 and social forces.24 The United States and its allies continue to enjoy special 
rights, privileges, and opt-outs that favour their interests within keystone LIO institutions, such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.25 Changes to the LIO’s decision-
making structures and power relations would alter its power-based and distributional 
consequences, but not necessarily the order itself, as defined by its social purpose. 
Secondly, liberal international institutions embody distinctively liberal social purposes.26 Social 
purpose refers to the substantive normative and policy content that international institutions 
represent.27 Many contemporary IOs, according to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, 
serve as ‘purveyors of liberal values, including human rights, democracy, and the rule of law’, 
as well as ‘liberal economic notions about the virtues of markets and capitalism as the best 
(and perhaps the only) means to “progress”’.28 Liberal social purpose is embedded in 
                                                          
21 In fact, it may be more accurate to speak of an international order with liberal features, but we will use 
LIO to refer to those liberal features for the sake of brevity. 
22 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International 
Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2000), pp. 421–56; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘The Politics, 
Power, and Pathologies of International’, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1999), pp. 699–732. 
23 Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); Randall W. Stone, Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
24 Robert W. Cox, ‘Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’, Millennium, Vol. 12, No. 2 
(1983), pp. 162–75. 
25 Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0’; Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade, ‘Protecting Power: How 
Western States Retain The Dominant Voice in The World Bank’s Governance’, World Development, Vol. 46 
(2013), pp. 153–64; David Skidmore, The Unilateralist Temptation in American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), pp. 17–42. 
26 Barnett and Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Institutions’, p. 708; 
Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0’; John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 
380. 
27 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change’, p. 382; Andrew Baker, ‘Macroprudential 
Regimes and the Politics of Social Purpose’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2018), 
pp. 293–316; Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Sandy 
Brian Hager, ‘The Social Purpose of New Governance: Lisbon and the Limits to Legitimacy’, Journal of 
International Relations and Development, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2010), pp. 209–38. 
28 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. ix. 
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rules and agreements that favour the market-led allocation of resources, prioritise economic 
openness over collective management and public oversight, and foster individualist 
conceptions of human rights and procedural notions of democracy. These liberal concepts are 
defining features of the LIO because they relate to its normative content. International 
institutions that are neutral with regard to certain core issues, such as human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law, markets, and capitalism, should not be considered liberal. 
The policy field of multilateral development finance is a key component of the LIO. The World 
Bank, the largest and only global multilateral development bank, has often served as a major 
conduit for the dissemination of liberal economic prescriptions via its research and loan 
activities. During the 1990s—a period of US predominance—the average number of 
conditions entailed in the bank’s policy-based lending increased considerably29 and, together 
with its policy-related research activities, earned it a reputation as a key representative of the 
liberal Washington Consensus, characterised by commitments to trade liberalisation, reduced 
fiscal deficits, privatisation, and financial liberalisation.30 Today, the Bank’s approach has been 
described as a ‘post’ or ‘augmented’ Washington Consensus, wherein the commitment to 
economic liberalism is augmented by a greater focus on domestic governance issues.31 This 
became visible most recently in fresh debates over the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Report,32 which China has long criticised as having an anti-regulation stance.33 
If, then, China is rising in the context of an international order with liberal characteristics, 
which features of the LIO will China support and which will it oppose? As China gains the 
power to alter the rules of the game, how will an 
                                                          
29 World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1114615847489/ConditionalityFinalDCpaperDC9-9-05.pdf. 
30 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002); Lance Taylor, 
‘Editorial: The Revival of the Liberal Creed—the IMF and the World Bank in a Globalized Economy’, World 
Development, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1997), pp. 145–52. 
31 Sarah Babb, ‘The Washington Consensus as Transnational Policy Paradigm: Its Origins, Trajectory and 
Likely Successor’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2013), pp. 268–97; Dani Rodrik 
and Roberto Zagha, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World 
Bank’s “Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform”’, Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 44, No. 4 (2006), pp. 973–87. 
32 Andre´ Broome, Alexandra Homolar, and Matthias Kranke, ‘Bad Science: International Organizations and 
the Indirect Power of Global Benchmarking’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 3 
(2018), pp. 514–39; ‘The World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” Report Faces Tricky Questions’, The 
Economist, 20 January, 2018, https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21735076-
embarrassingly-they-are-raised-and-then-answeredby-its-chief-economist-world. 
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international order with Chinese characteristics differ from the status quo in distributional and 
social terms? 
 
The Creation of the AIIB and Liberal International Order: Theoretical Approaches 
Building on existing theory, we develop a framework to analyse the AIIB’s relationship to the 
LIO. Our basic argument is that prevailing state-centric approaches have spoken narrowly to a 
single dimension of the LIO related to matters of institutional structure, authority, and power. 
A fuller understanding of the LIO requires consideration of its social components, including the 
social groups and normative orders it serves.34 
 
State-centric Approaches 
China’s launching of the AIIB can be considered, from a rationalist, state-centric perspective, 
as a case of institutional creation,35 institutional proliferation,36 creation of an overlapping 
institution,37 or contested multilateralism.38 Such approaches build primarily on two types of 
rational institutionalism: functionalist (gains-oriented) and distributive (power-based). 
Both functionalist institutionalism39 and distributive institutionalism (the former associated 
with liberal theory and the latter with realist theory) are concerned primarily with patterns of 
international conflict and cooperation, rather than the social orders that such patterns 
produce. They treat states as unitary actors whose goals can be described in quantitative 
terms (i.e. gains or losses). As Andrew Moravcsik has observed, neither functionalist nor 
distributive institutionalism ‘explains the changing substantive goals and purposes over which 
states conflict and cooperate; both focus instead on formal causes, such as relative power or 
issue density, and formal consequences, such as conflict and cooperation per se’.40 
Although these approaches converge in their concern with the distribution of gains and 
authority within international institutional arrangements, they differ 
                                                          
34 In this respect, our approach to international order echoes Peter Gourevitch’s distinction between the two 
core features of a political system: regime type and coalition pattern. See Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second 
Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 
(1978), p. 883. 
35 Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal, Institutional Choice and Global Commerce (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
36 Kellerman, ‘The Proliferation of Multilateral Development Banks’; Pratt, ‘Angling for Influence’. 
37 Urpelainen and van de Graaf, ‘Your Place or Mine?’. 
38 Morse and Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’. 
39 Sometimes referred to as liberal institutionalism or regime theory. 
40 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), p. 534. 
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over which logic predominates: functionalist institutionalism assumes profit-oriented, 
absolute gains logic; distributive institutionalism emphasises power-based, relative gains logic. 
 
Functional Institutionalism 
For functional institutionalists, international institutions provide efficient solutions to 
collective action problems and other impediments to mutually beneficial interstate 
cooperation.41 The domestic character and social purposes of the participating states and 
dominant social groups, however, lie outside of the scope of the theory and are, hence, largely 
ignored. 
From a functional institutionalist perspective, China’s creation of the AIIB presents a puzzle. 
Given the costs of institutional setup and the uncertainty of success, it is unclear why states 
sometimes create new institutions—such as the AIIB—that duplicate the work of already 
existing institutions.42 Dysfunction or underperformance on the part of existing institutions 
may be one motivation for such institutional innovation. Dissatisfied stakeholders may push 
for reform when international organisations become bloated and inefficient. As institutions 
age, a number of organisational pathologies may arise.43 The leadership and staff of IOs may 
seek expansion of their own power and resources and greater independence from the control 
of sponsoring states (i.e. the principal-agent problem).44 Mission creep may lead to an ever 
broader and more diffuse agenda that moves the organisation further from its core 
competencies, and a lack of market competition, strict oversight, or hard budget caps might 
cause its inefficiencies to proliferate. 
The functionalist approach proposes that the creation of a new institution may be the result of 
bargaining failure, whereby attempts to reform established institutions have been blocked by 
internal veto players, or of a failure to successfully signal commitment.45 This suggests that 
China’s sponsorship of the AIIB may represent an effort to create a more focused, efficient, 
and responsive institution 
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in the field of multilateral development finance. This would likely be the result of previous 
failed attempts to reform legacy institutions. 
If new institutions are designed with the same purposes in mind as existing ones and seek 
merely to improve on their performance or operate with greater efficiency, this would 
strongly imply that functional gains-seeking is at play. Therefore, if the AIIB were designed to 




Other state-centric approaches stress the role of power in shaping institutional outcomes. 
Almost all international institutions raise distributive issues, giving rise to relative gains 
dynamics.46 Realists have conceived of international institutions as ‘intervening variables’ 
between the underlying distribution of power and international outcomes.47 As Steven 
Krasner argues, misalignments can arise between underlying power distributions and 
institutional governance due to the stickiness of institutional adaptation. International 
institutions also often fall prey to the informal control mechanisms that powerful states wield, 
which would further disadvantage rising powers.48 It would not be surprising, therefore, if 
China, as a rising power, sought to correct the mismatch between its meagre influence within 
existing multilateral institutions and its growing capabilities.49 
From this perspective, we should expect the Chinese decision to sponsor a new institution (i.e. 
the AIIB) to follow close on the heels of China’s failed efforts to gain greater voice within 
existing multilateral development institutions. But, in contrast to functional institutionalism, 
we would also expect the reigning hegemon, the United States, to resist the creation of new 
China-centred institutions that compete with those which it and its allies dominate. In general, 
therefore, China’s sponsorship of the AIIB should show evidence of an overriding desire to 
maximise China’s power and influence within the international development finance regime.
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Societal Approaches 
From a state-centric perspective, institutional innovation may be explained as the result of 
dissatisfaction with existing institutions, either because of institutional inefficiencies 
(functionalist) or due to a mismatch between material and institutional power (distributive). 
Although this tells us much about the potential for institutional innovation within the LIO, 
both theories are agnostic regarding the substantive norms, principles, and practices of new 
institutions. Both ignore international institutions’ social purposes or the role of states or 
social forces in pursuing particular social orders or sets of normative values. Rather, each 
describes institutional variation in respect of efficiency (functionalist) or of the distribution of 
voting power and other aspects of governance (power-based).50 
To situate the AIIB in the context of the LIO as a social order, it is necessary to engage societal 
theories of international politics. By societal theories, we mean approaches that embed 
international politics and institutions in a qualitative social context defined by social groups 
and ideas. Societal approaches emphasise the ‘substantive goals and purposes over which 
states conflict and cooperate’51 and analyse states ‘as both the products of evolving societies 
and as shapers of those societies’.52 Here, we derive expectations about the AIIB from two 
societal approaches: ‘World Society’ constructivism (also known as sociological 
institutionalism) and second-image ‘social order’ approaches. The former operates according 
to an ‘outside-in’ logic, while the latter links states’ conduct to their domestic and 
transnational societies (‘inside-out’).53 What unites these approaches is their concern for the 
social quality of international orders. 
 
World Society Approach 
World society constructivism begins with the observation that the evolution of the global 
order over the past several centuries has been dominated by the gradual spread and 
increasing elaboration of a set of modern, liberal norms and principles.54 As non-Western 
societies have opened—whether by consent or coercion—to the penetration of external ideas 
and material exchange, they have become socialised into a set of universalising norms and 
institutions. This socialisation process works from the outside-in: a state’s external behaviour 
and interaction 
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with the outside world conform more quickly than its domestic culture and institutions. From 
this perspective, China should remain a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker, even as it 
sponsors the creation of new multilateral institutions. We should, hence, expect the AIIB to 
import rules, standards, and procedures from already existing development banks, even 
where such standards differ markedly from those practiced within China itself.55 In line with a 
logic of appropriateness, therefore, China will emulate existing LIO norms, standards, and 
practices in an effort to ensure that Chinese-sponsored institutions are viewed as legitimate.56 
While functional institutionalists view ‘institutions as exogenous rule-based, sanction-based 
constraints on non-changing agents’,57 constructivists, on the other hand, argue that 
engagement with international institutions changes the identity of participating states and 
reinforces collective norms of behaviour. From the World Society theory perspective, the 
spread of liberal, modern norms and values over the past two centuries has gradually 
redefined appropriate state behaviour. International institutions embody universal, liberal 
norms and also serve as agents for socialising newly open states into the specifically liberal 
rules of the LIO.58 From this perspective, China’s willingness to orient the AIIB towards the 
norms, standards, and rule-sets of the pre-existing development finance regime would offer 
strong evidence of this socialisation process and a reproduction of LIO. 
 
Social Order Theory 
Social order theories argue that great powers seek to structure the international system along 
lines compatible with their own political, social, and economic institutions. The basic process 
moves from the inside-out: states seek to ‘establish a basic compatibility between domestic 
and international policy objectives’.59 Consequently, states leave traces of their domestic 
orders in their foreign policies and in international orders.60 From a social order perspective, 
therefore, the AIIB should reflect elements of China’s single-party political system and state-
capitalist 
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political economy, which would put it in tension with the LIO of the largely democratic, liberal 
capitalist ‘West’.61 
Samuel Huntington offered a strong version of a culturalist social order model in his ‘clash of 
civilisations’ thesis, which depicts Sinic and Western cultures as bound for conflict.62 Martin 
Jaques similarly argues that China has pioneered its distinctive path to modernity and will 
externalise the principals of its political and cultural systems.63 Charles Kupchan likewise 
asserts that great powers inevitably export their domestic orders, meaning that China will 
‘challenge the foundational norms of Pax Americana’ and instead advance its own norms in 
keeping with its ideological preferences and material interests.64 
If the strong versions of social order theory are correct, we should expect the AIIB to reflect a 
fundamental challenge to the basic principles, norms, and rules of the LIO. If China sought to 
overturn the LIO, for instance, the AIIB might embody mercantilist principles, strongly favour 
state-owned firms, take the form of an exclusive regional economic bloc, or fail to incorporate 
protection of human rights, the environment, or honest government.65 A social order model, 
therefore, would lead us to expect Western countries to unite in boycotting the AIIB, as 
countries might be confronted with a normative clash that forces them to choose between the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank on one hand and the AIIB on the other. 
A weaker version of the social order model emerges from comparative capitalism research. 
From this perspective, a state’s stance on multilateral economic issues will be influenced by 
judgments on whether such initiatives are likely to sustain or to undermine the comparative 
institutional advantages of their nation’s economy. Governments should oppose initiatives 
that threaten those institutions most crucial to their firms’ competitive advantages.66 From 
this perspective, we should expect China to promote different, less liberal forms of economic
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regulation commensurate with its state-led form of capitalism.67 China could, hence, use the 
AIIB to promote a ‘China model’ of development as an alternative to the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ that the World Bank and IMF have promoted, with varying levels of intensity, since 
the 1990s. Although the depth of conflict would be more limited than that suggested by 
Huntington or Jacques, the AIIB would nevertheless serve as a competitor to rather than as a 
collaborator with the legacy development banks and signal a challenge to the LIO at a 
normative level. Table 1 summarises these approaches and their observable implications. 
 
The AIIB and Liberal International Order 
This framework guides our qualitative analysis of the AIIB. For data, we examine sources that 
include the AIIB’s founding documents and institutional design, its staff composition, 
statements made by state and bank officials, and analyses of its early operations. First, we 
examine to what extent the creation of the AIIB conforms to the observable implications of 
functionalist or distributive forms of state-centric theory. Secondly, we use societal 
approaches to assess the compatibility of the AIIB with the social purpose of the LIO in the 
issue area of development lending. 
 
AIIB Design: Efficiency-seeking Gains or Power Redistribution? 
There is significant evidence of a role for functional gains with regard to China’s decision to 
initiate the AIIB. Developing countries have long complained about the bureaucratic burdens, 
high transaction costs, and lengthy approval processes at existing MDBs.68 Chinese and AIIB 
officials have repeatedly promoted the Bank as a ‘lean’ organisation, with a small staff, a non-
resident Board, and low overhead costs.69 Chinese critics describe the World Bank’s 
management structure—including a resident Board that costs $70 million per year—as slow, 
cumbersome, and expensive.70 These costs represent between 3 and 7% of the 
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institution’s operating budget.71 It takes, on average, seven years for a project to progress 
from proposal to approval to completion at the ADB.72 Commenting on this, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Lou Jiwei explicitly touted shorter project execution times as one of the bank’s goals. 
‘We would not bureaucratize the AIIB. Instead, we need to be efficient and “green”.’73 
AIIB officials have stated that although the new Bank will reference existing best practices, it 
will also ‘make adjustments to some of the regulations of the established MDBs in order to 
raise operating efficiency and improve upon current practices that are overly complicated and 
not highly relevant to the actual conditions’.74 One example is that responsibility for project 
approval lies 
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chiefly with the Bank’s management rather than the Board of Directors.75 Indeed, many of the 
design features that differentiate the AIIB from the World Bank stem from recommendations 
of the High-Level Commission on Modernisation of World Bank Group Governance chaired by 
former President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo, which criticised the World Bank for bloat and 
inefficiency.76 
Criticism of the Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)—has focused not only on issues of speed and efficiency but also on their poor 
performance with regard to preventing and managing regional and global financial crises.77 In 
the wake of the Asian financial crisis of the late 90s and the global financial crisis of 2008 and 
beyond, many Asian leaders concluded that their countries were overly dependent upon trade 
and financial ties with the West and sought to steer their economies towards stronger 
regional integration and alternative mechanisms for managing financial risk. The dramatic 
declines in investment flows from the World Bank and private capital after 2008 underlined 
the urgency of these problems.78 
In 2010, therefore, China and the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) launched a $10 billion investment fund. In the same year, ASEAN, together 
with China, Japan, and South Korea, announced the Chiang Mai Initiative, which provided a 
foreign exchange reserve pool for Member States to tap at times of financial crisis.79 The AIIB’s 
creation, thus, followed more than a decade of deliberations among East Asian governments 
on institutional innovation to meet regional needs and provide alternatives to the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
As often emphasised, the AIIB’s focus on infrastructure reflected the particular needs and 
priorities of Asian countries.80 Famously, in 2010, the ADB estimated 
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that Asian countries needed around US $776 billion in annual infrastructure investment.81 
From China’s perspective, the AIIB constitutes a vehicle for marshalling and channelling Asia’s 
savings glut specifically to meet these infrastructure needs.82 Thus, China had both the 
incentive and the capacity to sponsor a competing institution. But the AIIB’s infrastructure 
mission was also demand-driven in response to the articulated desires of potential recipient 
countries. 
The Chinese government also has hopes that the competition the AIIB generates for existing 
development banks will force the latter to adapt.83 Indeed, this may already have occurred, as 
both the World Bank and the ADB have promised to streamline project approval and reduce 
overhead costs.84 Since China’s push to create the AIIB, both institutions have also promised 
to allocate greater resources to infrastructure development.85 
China’s choice of multilateralism rather than unilateralism can also be explained from a 
functionalist perspective. MDBs, in contrast to national development banks, pool the 
resources of multiple countries, so spreading political and economic risks and facilitating 
coordination among recipient and lending countries on projects with transnational spillovers 
and network effects. This accurately describes the AIIB’s ambit.86 
Given its particular economic needs and those of its neighbours, China held a strong interest 
in expanding infrastructure investment in Asia and had plentiful resources to devote to this 
task but found existing development banks poor vehicles for the appropriate channelling of 
such resources. From a functional institutionalist perspective, China’s sponsorship of the AIIB 
represents an effort to create a more focused, efficient, and responsive institution wherein 
China would naturally exercise considerable, although not exclusive, control. 
At the same time, there is also evidence that relative-gains considerations played a role in the 
AIIB’s creation and that the AIIB will effect a redistribution of authority within the field of 
multilateral development financing. Although functional institutionalism can account well for 
the creation of the AIIB and its 
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efficiency focus, it is less able to account for the political trade-offs and conflicts underlying its 
creation. 
In line with a power-distributive approach, the inadequacy of Chinese representation in the 
World Bank’s voting share was a key background factor of Chinese dissatisfaction with the 
status quo ante.87 China, together with other BRICS countries, had long called for a faster and 
greater quota and voice reform at the World Bank,88 but this effort brought only grudging 
concessions from the World Bank’s dominant shareholders.89 Although China gained greater 
voting power as part of a package of Bank reforms in 2010, it remained far from proportional 
to China’s actual weight in the world economy, leaving the United States in a position to veto 
key World Bank decisions. The US Congress, moreover, delayed approval of the 2010 Bank 
reforms until 2015,90 by which time China was even more under-represented. 
First announced in 2013, the AIIB, therefore, could be considered part of a Chinese effort to 
enhance its relative power by creating a competitive institution capable of weakening the US-
dominated World Bank and the Japan-dominated ADB’s influence or at least expanding 
Chinese influence within existing institutions through demonstrating that it offers a credible 
‘exit option’.91 The AIIB’s location in Beijing and the presence of Chinese nationals high in the 
bank’s secretariat also enable it to provide scope for Beijing’s exercise, similar to that of the 
United States’ within the Bretton Woods institutions, of informal paths of control over the 
institution.92 
On the other hand, ideas about a China-centred Asian investment bank had been floated as 
early as 2007.93 The AIIB was itself originally attached to the much more ambitious Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) unveiled in 2013. The BRI provides a means for China’s economy to 
integrate more closely with those of its neighbours. As China built-out its own domestic 
infrastructure, moreover, 
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Chinese construction and engineering firms were eager to find new markets for their 
capacities through the BRI. The AIIB would provide the financing necessary to exploit such 
opportunities in regions stretching from Southeast Asia to Southeast Europe. For this reason, 
some argue that, even if reforms at the World Bank and IMF had been more accommodating, 
‘China would still have proposed the establishment of an institution like the AIIB.’94 
But is the AIIB nevertheless part of a zero-sum power contest between China and the United 
States and its allies? If so, it would appear to be more the result of US attempts to undermine 
the bank than Chinese attempts to exclude the United States.95 China took steps early on to 
assuage American concerns about the AIIB and to smooth the way for the US membership, to 
the extent of offering to reduce China’s voting share to below the 25% veto threshold if the 
United States and Japan agreed to join as founding members.96 Jin Liqun, later named AIIB’s 
first president, visited Washington DC in September 2014 to make a pitch for US participation. 
When Evan S. Medeiros, senior China advisor on the National Security Council, remarked, ‘I 
am not going to buy the cake you have cooked,’ Jin reportedly replied: ‘you are always 
welcome into the kitchen to help with the baking.’97 
Despite these Chinese efforts at reassurance, the United States initially criticised the AIIB as an 
effort to undermine the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. American and Japanese 
officials also raised questions on whether or not the AIIB would meet the necessarily high 
standards of environmental and social protection and anti-corruption. The United States 
actively discouraged Australia, South Korea, and European countries from joining the Bank, 
although most US allies ignored this advice.98 After the UK announced its plans to join the 
Bank, a White House official declared: ‘We are wary about a trend toward constant 
accommodation of China.’99 Others worried that the AIIB threatened to fragment and weaken 
global economic governance.100 
As regards the AIIB’s relationship to pre-existing MDBs, both Chinese and AIIB officials have 
gone out of their way to emphasise that the AIIB will closely collaborate with the World Bank 
and ADB. In fact, the AIIB’s Articles of 
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Agreement stipulate that it will ‘complement the existing multilateral development banks’.101 
The AIIB’s initial loans, moreover, have been made as a junior partner in World Bank- and 
Asian Development Bank-led projects.102 The AIIB welcomed World Bank staff as consultants 
on the new bank’s design and hired many former World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
employees.103 China has, moreover, increased its investment stake in both the World Bank 
and the ADB since the AIIB was announced.104 AIIB President Jin Liqun emphasised that, ‘It is 
certainly a misconception that the creation of this new bank is meant to create a rivalry 
against the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the World Bank.’105 
Although the degree of competition among these institutions could, of course, grow over 
time, China has assiduously sought to avoid perceptions that the AIIB represents a direct 
challenge to existing MDBs, having actively courted the membership of self-perceived 
upholders of the liberal order. In this way, China’s strategy conforms closely to a pattern of 
‘strategic restraint’, wherein international institutions are used to reduce fears of China’s rise 
and reassure lesser states of China’s commitments.106 Moreover, the AIIB has adopted norms, 
rules, and procedures that are much closer to global standards than those China practices in 
its bilateral aid programmes. Thus, China both dilutes its potential influence and accepts 
deeper constraints by redirecting aid resources through multilateral channels. 
The design of the AIIB also suggests that China left potential relative gains on the bargaining 
table by accepting conditions less favourable than might be expected in view of its financial 
weight in the organisation. Having contributed one-third of the initial capital (33.4%), China’s 
voting weight is 28.5%.107 
                                                          
101 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Subscriptions and Voting 
Power of Member Countries’, 22 September, 2016, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-
are/membership-status/.content/index/_download/20160930035841674.pdf. 
102 Sam Fleming, ‘AIIB and World Bank to World on Joint Projects’, Financial Times, 15 April, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/3995f790-01b0-11e6-ac98-3c15a1aa2e62; Hameiri and Jones, ‘China 
Challenges Global Governance?’. 
103 Indeed, former World Bank official Natalie Lichtenstein drafted the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement while 
another former World Bank staffer, Stephen Lintner, designed the AIIB’s environmental and social 
framework. Tamar Gutner, ‘AIIB: Is the Chinese-led Development Bank a Role Model?’, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 25 June, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/aiib-chinese-led-development-bank-role-model. 
104 Perlez, ‘China Creates a World Bank of its Own, and the U.S. Balks’. 
105 Tabita Diela and Iwan Subarkah, ‘AIIB President Dismisses Accusations of Rivalry with ADB, World Bank’, 
Jakarta Globe, 11 May, 2017, https://jakartaglobe.id/economy/aiib-president-dismisses-accusations-rivalry-
adb-world-bank/. 
106 Chen and Liu, ‘Granting Reassurance while Posing Challenge’; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: 
Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
107 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Subscriptions and Voting 
Power of Member Countries’. 
 
 
Originally published in: 
 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol 12 (2019), Iss. 1, p. 81 
Although this will initially ensure China’s veto power over key decisions (for which a 75% 
supermajority is required), Chinese authorities have intimated their disinclination to maintain 
veto power as new Member States gradually dilute China’s voting share.108 Another key 
indicator is the greater number of ‘basic’ votes allocated on a one-state, one-vote basis.109 As 
with other development banks, AIIB founder members’ votes consist of basic votes, share 
votes, and bonus votes. Whereas basic votes make up only 5.55% of World Bank (IBRD) voting 
shares, in the AIIB they account for 12%.110 This gives poorer Member States a much bigger 
role than in other banks. 
Although many observers initially expected loans to be denominated in RMB,111 in keeping 
with China’s stated goal to diversify global financial flows, the AIIB will in fact conduct all 
transactions in US dollars (although Chinese currency transactions may be introduced over 
time).112 Rather than limiting membership to Asian countries, moreover, all World Bank and 
ADB members are eligible, and already includes a number of major European powers.113 China 
has also stated that the United States and Japan are welcome to join, despite both countries’ 
initially negative attitudes towards the AIIB’s creation, and the fact that US and/or Japanese 
membership would dilute Chinese sway. 
Distributive institutionalism is consistent with China’s frustrated efforts to gain greater voting 
power within existing MDBs, with its consequent decision to sponsor the AIIB, and with the US 
resistance to these moves. Yet China has exercised a degree of restraint patently incompatible 
with the assumptions of relative-gains seeking. Indeed, Beijing has sought to balance a 
message of growing strength and leadership with steps designed to offer reassurance of 
benign intent.114 China’s strategy is not to replace existing institutions but rather to ensure 
greater ‘portfolio diversification’ across institutional platforms.115 In contrast to the 
predictions of power-based institutionalism, China has made greater 
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accommodations of the pre-existing MDB regime (especially in institutional design and 
cooperation with other MDBs) than a purely distributive strategy would suggest. 
Functionalist institutionalism and distributive institutionalism each offer useful insights into 
China’s decision to sponsor the AIIB, although the latter theory cannot account for the degree 
of Chinese restraint as regards seeking relative gains. Nonetheless, neither variant of rational 
institutionalism addresses important questions about the qualitative focus off the AIIB and the 
type of development it seeks to promote, which is critical to the AIIB’s ultimate impact on the 
distinctly liberal elements of international order. To address this broader question, we need to 
examine the social purposes underlying Chinese strategic behaviour. 
 
AIIB’s Social Purpose: Reproducing or Challenging Liberalism? 
As has been widely recognised, the formal institutional structure of the AIIB closely models 
the format of established MDBs.116 AIIB’s tripartite governance structure of President and 
staff, Board of Directors, and Board of Governors reflects the typical MDB structure. Although, 
in contrast to the World Bank and the ADB, the Board of Directors is non-resident, which some 
have suggested would limit management oversight,117 this is not an unprecedented 
innovation, the Development Bank of Latin America having adopted it in 1970. The AIIB’s 
policy of capping the shares of ‘non-regional’ members is also in line with other regional 
development banks. 
Despite these clear signs of institutional isomorphism,118 Obama administration officials and 
other critics expressed concern that the AIIB would diverge substantively from the 
development policies and practices of established MDBs.119 Particular concern surrounded 
policy conditionality and transparency and anti-corruption, accountability, and environmental 
and labour standards.120 There were concerns that its focus on efficiency might motivate the 
AIIB to privilege 
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quick turnarounds over rigorous safeguards, human rights protection, and promotion of ‘good 
governance’,121 which would constitute a significant challenge to the LIO’s established norms 
in the area of multilateral development finance. 
However, the AIIB has in many respects (so far) conformed to the global norms and practices 
of existing MDBs. This fits the overall picture of China’s socialisation into the established LIO. 
AIIB staff and Chinese government officials have consistently signalled the commitment to 
ensure that the AIIB’s lending practices are in line with global norms.122 At its outset, the bank 
drew up a ‘Social and Environmental Framework’, consulted with lender governments and 
NGOs, and even hired the World Bank’s former senior technical adviser on safeguard 
policies.123 The normative framework within which this Chinese-led institution presents itself 
hews remarkably closely to liberal ideas and norms—even though the operation of such 
norms is only faintly evident in Chinese domestic society.124 
Moreover, having relied heavily on co-financing with established MDBs, the AIIB is bound to 
follow the conditions of legacy MDBs.125 It is too early to judge whether this policy framework 
will translate into compliant behaviour in the long run. But paper compliance with and 
conformity to global models has indeed been secured, in keeping with World Society 
expectations. This would imply parallels with China’s broader engagement in global economic 
governance. Entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 compelled China’s revision 
of many laws and institutions to meet WTO standards.126 The PRC has imported legal 
standards and regulations relating to such areas as disability, environment, and anti-
corruption reforms that drew upon relevant United Nations conventions.127 Indeed, the 
Chinese government can reap reputational gains solely to the extent 
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whereby AIIB policies resonate with widely held perceptions of appropriateness.128 In line with 
the concept of ‘laundering’ activities via independent and impartial international 
organisations, this serves an important role in garnering acceptance and legitimacy for 
projects that would otherwise be funded through bilateral aid: ‘States may prefer 
development assistance from an independent financial institution over direct aid from 
another state, especially a former colonial power or one seeking political influence.’129 
In addition to institutional legitimacy and prestige, China gains benefits from ensuring that the 
AIIB conforms to perceived ‘best practices’ within the global development regime. First, the 
AIIB may serve as another lever for the Chinese leadership to push Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) towards higher standards of environmental quality, transparency, honesty, 
and efficiency, as China looks to move up the economic value chain. International 
commitments can, thus, be used to promote reforms both at home and in China’s overseas 
investments.130 Many of the practices that have evoked the most serious criticism of Chinese 
SOEs, with regard to their investments abroad, are neither products of strategic direction nor 
efforts to challenge liberal norms, but rather the result of an increasingly fragmented state 
authority and growing SOE autonomy in China.131 Chinese authorities may see the AIIB as a 
vehicle through which to learn the best practices for setting and bringing into effect high 
standards in disciplining overseas aid and investment projects. Yet, as Hameiri and Jones 
note,132 the small size of the AIIB portfolio relative to China’s overall foreign aid and 
investment may limit its broader impact. 
Secondly, the Chinese leadership has recognised the benefits accruing to the United States 
through its centrality within inter- and trans-governmental networks and institutions.133 In the 
contemporary international system, governmental elites are ever more integrated at an 
international level, forming trans-governmental networks and a global bureaucracy wherein 
the international-domestic dichotomy has broken down, making them increasingly significant 
in the shaping of governance outcomes.134 This internationalisation of state functions has 
closely followed the internationalisation of production, consumption, 
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and exchange.135 As Ruban Gonzalez-Vicente emphasises, the internationalisation of the 
Chinese state under the leadership of the Communist Party of China has unfolded subsequent 
to the process whereby former communist ministries were transformed into SOEs, resulting 
not in a liberal market economy but rather in an ‘entrepreneurial state’ that exercises control 
over corporations with Fortune 500 rankings and which has deep commitments to 
international markets.136 
From the Chinese leadership’s perspective, national power relates to the placement of 
Chinese elites in influential global social networks. Yet until now, such elites have remained 
largely outside such networks.137 Consequently, there is evidence that the Chinese 
government seeks to ‘increase its global social power through networking with other 
prominent countries’ and building China-centred multilateral institutions.138 The AIIB provides 
one vehicle for thickening the connections between relatively insulated state-party-corporate 
networks and the broader transnational networks of corporate elites, government officials, IO 
staff, and technical experts that will come together through AIIB projects. 
Yet these networks are typically organised around sets of shared epistemic and normative 
assumptions and knowledge, and tighter connections may serve as mechanisms for further 
socialising key Chinese participants.139 Particularly, since Jiang Zemin’s legitimation of the 
Chinese business class in 2002, the interaction of the Chinese party-state model with 
international standards has resulted in a ‘growing permeability of ideologies in the Chinese 
state.’140 This highlights the double-edged nature of the AIIB from China’s perspective: 
constructing China-centred institutions not only builds Chinese social and relational power but 
also serves to socialise Chinese elites into norms that stand in tension with Chinese domestic 
structures.141 
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Thirdly, there also exist material incentives to conform to the pre-existing norms of the 
multilateral development aid regime. Like other MDBs, the AIIB will raise funds by issuing 
bonds on commercial markets, and investors will give weight to the ratings that credit rating 
agencies place upon these bonds. This means that the AIIB must meet the standards of 
governance that are in line with what such agencies define as international best practices, as 
they will not otherwise issue favourable ratings.142 
In general, China’s behaviour with respect to the AIIB appears relatively consistent with the 
idea that China and other states are under strong socialisation pressure to conform to global 
norms, especially when they seek buy-in for new international institutions from other states. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear exactly how deep such socialisation has gone.143 Despite the striking 
institutional isomorphism of the AIIB vis-à-vis established MDBs, our analysis implies that the 
AIIB indeed bears certain hallmarks of China’s particular social order, which differentiate it 
from the social purpose of the LIO. 
First, the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement stipulate that it will take a politically neutral approach. 
This at least differentiates the AIIB from explicitly liberal MDBs, such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which Western and former Soviet-aligned countries 
set up in the aftermath of the Cold War and which aligned much more closely to the policy 
preferences, beliefs, and resources of legitimacy of Western countries.144 In contrast to the 
overtly liberal EBRD, the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement stipulate that, ‘The Bank, its President, 
officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned. Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.’145 The Chinese government is 
deeply wary of Western attempts to use human rights and limitations on sovereignty as a 
political tool and has 
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consequently espoused a broader doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of other 
countries.146 As the Information Office of the State Council of China explains: 
China has firmly opposed to [sic] any country making use of the issue of human rights to 
sell its own values, ideology, political standards and mode of development, and to [sic] any 
country interfering in the internal affairs of other countries on the pretext of human rights, 
the internal affairs of developing countries in particular, and so hurting the sovereignty 
and dignity of many developing countries. […] China has always maintained that human 
rights are essentially matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a country. Respect for 
each country’s sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs are universally 
recognized principles of international law, which are applicable to all fields of international 
relations, and of course applicable to the field of human rights as well.147 
By extending Chinese influence through a formal multilateral organisation committed to the 
doctrine of non-interference, the AIIB strengthens the Chinese government’s ability to raise 
this normative challenge to the LIO. AIIB officials have not only pledged to uphold existing 
standards of multilateral development lending but have also suggested a ‘more business-like 
approach’, with a lesser focus on poverty reduction and promotion of political and social 
change.148 China’s overriding message has been to defend sovereignty, pluralism, and diversity 
in political and economic institutions against perceived efforts by the United States to impose 
a singular, universal model. In this respect, China presents a challenge to the LIO, not by 
championing a ready-made alternative, but by rejecting political and economic uniformity, 
and advancing a norm of international diversity. In keeping with this approach, China has also 
largely eschewed the attachment of political or economic conditions to its bilateral foreign 
assistance.149 
Even if the AIIB offers only slightly more lenient terms on its loans than established MDBs, it is 
the relative absence of conditions that creates worries in certain quarters that existing 
development institutions and donor countries will find insisting upon maintaining their 
particular standards difficult when bargaining with recipient countries if a more forgiving 
alternative is available.150 By stoking the trend towards institutional proliferation, the creation 
of the AIIB ushers in an ‘age of choice’ wherein borrowing countries can pick and choose.151 
Indeed, there 
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is evidence that the governments of many of the least developed countries have chosen more 
expensive development finance options that carry fewer conditions.152 Although the AIIB did, 
in its early days, co-finance and, therefore, conform to existing standards, a greater 
institutional choice would make promoting a particular development model more difficult for 
any country in the long run. If this holds, then the AIIB and other new ‘counter-institutional’ 
initiatives may erode the efficacy of certain levers of liberal influence in the global political 
economy. 
Secondly, as social order models would expect, the focus on infrastructure is itself reflective of 
China’s distinctive political and economic system, implying a more subtle path whereby 
China’s internal order is becoming externalised in its interaction with global processes.153 
China has leaned heavily upon infrastructure-led development, even by comparison with 
other East Asian countries that placed infrastructure at the centre of their economic 
development strategies. China has also supported existing multilateral institutions’ greater 
focus on infrastructure.154 Infrastructure-led development typically privileges states over 
markets. Most infrastructure projects are public-owned, and Chinese SOEs operating in 
infrastructural sectors have expanded overseas investment assets to more than $900 
billion.155 In short, the spread of infrastructure-led development models provides a 
mechanism for strengthening the legitimacy and centrality of China’s own political economy 
within the global order, extends Chinese influence,156 and provides opportunities that 
strengthen China’s state-owned sector. 
                                                          
152 Ibid. 
153 Jonge, ‘Perspectives on the Emerging Role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’. 
154 Morten Ougaard, ‘The Transnational State and the Infrastructure Push’, New Political Economy, Vol. 23, 
No. 1 (2018), pp. 128–44. 
155 Chen Aizhuand Matthew Miller, ‘Overseas Assets Held by China’s Centrally Owned Firms Top $900 
Billion’, 18 October, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-soes/overseas-assets-held-
by-chinas-centrally-owned-firms-top-900-billion-idUSKBN1CN0UE; Chow, ‘Why China Established the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank’, pp. 1292–5. Note that to date only three Chinese SEOs have won major AIIB 
contracts (most of which have been associated thus far with projects co-sponsored with the World Bank or 
the ADB). Private communications with RWR Advisory Group, https://www.rwradvisory.com. 
156 One form of influence arises from debt-dependence. Considering only extreme cases, one study has 
identified 10–15 countries that ‘could suffer from debt distress due to future BRI-related financing’. John 
Hurley, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance, ‘Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative 
from a Policy Perspective’, Center for Global Development Policy Paper, Vol. 121 (2018), p. 11. Through BRI, 
China is also gaining control over major infrastructure projects in other countries through ownership, lease 
or management arrangements. 
 
 
Originally published in: 
 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol 12 (2019), Iss. 1, p. 89 
Ultimately, this bolsters the control of the ruling Communist Party157 and rewards members of 
the governing coalition at the heart of China’s political order.158 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the AIIB and the BRI may well encourage other countries in 
the region to pursue a similar path, led by Chinese finance, expertise, and contracts.159 Chin 
and Thakur observe that although China attaches no mandatory conditions, it does advise 
recipients to emphasise ‘state support for core industries, foreign exchange management, 
(and) central bank direction of capital’.160 In the face of opposition from Western businesses 
and certain governments, China has often sought to legitimise the role of SOEs in economic 
development, for example, by persuading the BRICS countries to ‘acknowledge the important 
role that State Owned Companies (SOCs) play in the economy…’.161 And China has 
demonstrated growing confidence that its social model ‘offers a new option for other 
countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their 
independence’.162 These ideas and practices promote a shift towards greater state control and 
a loosening of liberal policy conditionality. 
To be sure, the spread of a ‘China model’ and the strengthening of economic networks 
centred upon China itself do not signal an intention to undermine or replace the existing LIO. 
In the design and early operations of the AIIB, China has, contrary to initial predictions, largely 
supported efforts to collaborate with existing development banks and to import most of the 
rules, norms, and standards associated with the current aid regime. China is itself heavily 
entwined with global markets and relies upon a strong private sector. 
Moreover, the very fact that China prefers state-to-state relations and limits its engagements 
with the broader civil society indeed impedes the transfer of Chinese norms and knowledge 
via aid projects. In contrast, not only do Western aid 
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agencies and private firms penetrate recipient societies more deeply, but Western NGOs also 
‘train and socialise local NGOs in developing nations … teaching a “Western model” of state-
society relations, whereby NGOs act as a watchdog and are sometimes antagonistic to the 
government’.163 As Chinese government-organised NGOs increasingly follow Chinese aid and 
investment, however, this asymmetry could change.164 
 
Conclusion 
As a key element of China’s new institutional initiatives, the AIIB provides an important 
medium for an assessment of the impact of China’s rise on the LIO as the latter faces renewed 
challenges from within. The complex forces currently driving international change belie simple 
predictions about the future of the LIO. In this article, we have argued that in order to render 
judgements about China’s relationship to the LIO, it is necessary not only to analyse the AIIB 
using the tools of state-centric IR theory but also to employ societal approaches to understand 
its social purpose. 
Our empirical findings are two-fold. First, both functional efficiencies and relative power 
dynamics appear to have played a role in China’s decision to create the AIIB. The AIIB can 
neither be attributed to simple gains-seeking nor to straightforward power politics. It is the 
two in combination that generate institutional change. Secondly, we find evidence in the AIIB 
of a remarkable level of conformity to existing norms and institutional models, implying a 
strong role for socialisation dynamics within the LIO in the issue area of multilateral 
development financing. Nonetheless, it is hard to judge how deep or lasting such socialisation 
really is, and certain features of the AIIB also reflect the growing global presence of China’s 
particular political-economic order. 
The AIIB’s focus on infrastructure-led development is itself an externalisation of China’s 
domestic political-economic model, much as changes in the US political–economic situation 
have shaped the World Bank and UN agencies’ agendas over previous decades.165 This model 
favours planning and state-ownership, and sees poverty reduction as a result of development, 
rather than the other way around. China’s political order, based upon Leninist principles, 
stands in stark contrast to Western liberal democracy, and China’s economy still retains strong 
elements of state guidance. Yet China has been profoundly changed over the past four 
decades through a process of ever deeper integration into a pre-existing liberal order. As a 
result, a hybrid social order has emerged which combines state-led development with 
entrepreneurial markets that relate to one another 
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‘compensatory, even seemingly contradictory fashion’.166 These internal tensions are mirrored 
by the frictions and mutual dependencies that exist between China’s hybrid social order and 
the LIO. They also appear to be built into the AIIB itself, so reflecting the somewhat 
contradictory influences of the global norms embedded in the LIO, and the structural features 
of China’s hybrid social order. 
One important caveat about our findings is that, in comparison to other Chinese-led 
institutions, the AIIB may qualify as the least likely case of a substantive challenge to the LIO 
for two key reasons: membership composition and issue area characteristics. First, China 
made important concessions to win the participation of many developed countries. The 
Chinese approach to international institution building, therefore, is somewhat diluted with 
regard to the AIIB. The bank’s membership composition may, hence, have a constraining 
influence on departures from the liberal social purpose when compared to regional 
organisations that exclude non-regional members. Secondly, the policy field of development 
banking may be one wherein—compared to other policy fields such as internet governance or 
human rights—the normative divergence between China and the LIO is less pronounced. This 
suggests the need for more research into the social purposes of China’s other multilateral 
initiatives and institutions. 
The AIIB and China’s new institutional initiatives may not constitute a ‘grand ideological 
alternative to a liberal international order’.167 Nor do they—in the words of German Foreign 
Minister Sigmar Gabriel—represent an effort ‘to put a Chinese stamp on the world and 
impose a Chinese system’.168 But this may be beside the point. The creation of new 
institutions may address functional deficiencies of long-established incumbent institutions and 
provide a mechanism for China to subvert the US institutional privileges. At the same time, the 
LIO’s distinctly liberal features may be eroded more effectively by going around them—either 
bilaterally, as in the case of the hub-and-spokes investment patterns that dominate China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative, or by adopting new international institutions that are indifferent to 
core liberal ideas, as in the case of AIIB. Even without openly challenging the LIO, therefore, 
the AIIB lends it Chinese characteristics. 
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